THE PRICE OF NOT MAKING A DECISION

Once again, Ferrari managed to turn a potentially favorable race into another opportunity only partially capitalized on. And the main problem isn't qualifying, or at least not in the way it's often portrayed. The SF-26 is lacking something over a single lap, especially in Q3 and under those conditions where the power unit is being pushed to its absolute limit.

It's a limitation we've known about practically since the start of the season. Continuing to say that Ferrari simply needs to “qualify better” means ignoring the characteristics of the car. Of course, that would be nice, but you can't expect its weakness to suddenly become one of its strengths.

The Dutch race, however, told a different story. Ferrari had the race pace and probably enough speed to get involved in the fight at the front. Beating Norris would still have been difficult, just as it was in Budapest, but that doesn't mean there wasn't an opportunity to achieve much more. Racing isn't just about outright performance: it's also about the opportunities you create and the ones you're sharp enough to capitalize on. And that's exactly where Ferrari continues to leave something on the table.

As for Leclerc's first start, personally, I don't see much to debate. Charles found himself caught in an almost unavoidable chain of events: Piastri had to react to a very slow Russell, suddenly moved over, and that triggered a sequence that eventually led to the slight contact between Hamilton and Verstappen. On a narrow, damp track, expecting Leclerc to anticipate all of that and react differently seems fairly unrealistic.

What happened at the second start is more debatable. Despite being on the hard tires, Piastri managed to get past Leclerc, who once again looked far too accommodating in his defense. Something similar had already happened in Budapest with Verstappen: Charles left the outside line completely open without really trying to force his rival onto a less favorable trajectory. A level of caution that, curiously enough, tends to disappear when Hamilton is behind him, with the door being shut much more decisively against Lewis.

The real problem with the race, however, began with strategy. When the first round of pit stops started, the two Ferraris found themselves out front, with roughly one second separating Leclerc and Hamilton and their pace looking anything but poor. Charles, however, was brought in very early, even though it was already clear that he would rejoin behind the leading group anyway.

Hamilton's management also raises a few questions. Lewis was on a different strategy and his pace was beginning to drop off, but not enough to make an immediate stop essential. He still had roughly three seconds in hand over the cars behind and a comfortable enough window to rejoin behind Leclerc regardless. If you genuinely want to attempt a one-stop strategy, then you need to have the courage to push it to the limit, waiting until that margin has actually been used up. Ferrari brought him in earlier instead. Then, ironically, they did the exact opposite with his second stop, leaving him out too long on worn-out tires and forcing him to defend against Antonelli and Norris.

The hardest moment to understand came after Hamilton's pit stop, when Lewis found himself stuck behind Leclerc and began losing time. It's something I had already brought up a few races ago: Ferrari still seems too focused on maintaining a perfect balance between its two drivers, even when the race situation simply requires someone to make a decision.

Over the last four races, Hamilton has lost a significant number of points partly because of some highly questionable calls from the pit wall. Budapest was already an example: Ferrari could easily have frozen the positions in the closing stages. It wouldn't have changed anything in the Constructors' Championship, while the driver higher up in the standings would have collected a few more points. That doesn't mean deciding in advance that Hamilton should always be favored. It simply means recognizing that a championship also has to be managed according to the standings, especially when there is now a significant gap between the two drivers.

In the Netherlands, the situation was even simpler. Hamilton and Leclerc were effectively running two different races, on different strategies and, more importantly, with different prospects. If Charles wasn't going to be called into the pits immediately, then the logical decision at that stage was to let Lewis through. Not because of any predetermined hierarchy, but because Hamilton had a genuine opportunity to fight for the podium at that point, and potentially even more, while Leclerc was primarily focused on his battle with Russell.

The other top teams make these decisions. Ferrari, on the other hand, continues to behave as though asking its drivers to swap positions somehow violates a moral principle. When you're the one chasing, you simply can't afford to leave points on the table just to avoid making an uncomfortable decision.

In the end, the two or three seconds Hamilton lost behind Leclerc were far from insignificant and probably cost him at least third place. Then there's the Virtual Safety Car, which came out almost immediately after Lewis had lost the lead. It's impossible to know what would have happened, but with a few more seconds in hand he might have been able to pit under the neutralization while remaining in a much stronger position. There was also an element of bad luck, with the neutralization coming just as Russell appeared increasingly vulnerable.

There was also some visible tension between the two Ferrari drivers toward the end, with Leclerc clearly unhappy with Hamilton's defense after his attempt to pass Russell. It's a scene that, unintentionally, sums up the problem rather well: Ferrari still seems to be paying too much attention to what happens between its two red cars and too little to how both of them can be used to maximize the team's overall result.

And that's exactly why I find it rather strange to suggest that Hamilton is obsessed with finishing the championship ahead of Leclerc. We're talking about a driver who has won seven World Championships and who, if he sees a genuine opportunity, clearly has ambitions that go far beyond simply winning an internal battle against his teammate.

None of this is Leclerc's fault. Charles isn't the problem. The problem is the way Ferrari continues to manage certain situations, almost as though the team wants to avoid taking a clear position between its drivers at all costs. Nobody is asking Ferrari to systematically sacrifice one driver for the other. The point is simply to read what's happening on track and act accordingly.

Because when you don't have clearly the best car, you can't control everything. But that's exactly why the few variables you can control need to be managed perfectly. And this year, far too often, Ferrari simply hasn't done that.

© Simone Marchetti Cavalieri