HOW ARTIFICIAL STANDARDS LED TO EUROPEAN IRRELEVANCE

The crisis of Europe’s major car brands does not arise from sudden technical incapacity, nor from some mysterious loss of talent. It stems from a fundamental misunderstanding: the idea that the market could be directed by decree toward unrealistic electrification standards, in timing and method.

For years, it was told that the transformation would be linear, inevitable, even exciting. Just set a date, establish ambitious targets, and the industry would take care of the rest. But the market is not a parliamentary chamber: it doesn’t vote by raising hands. It responds to price, convenience, infrastructure, and trust. And above all, it responds to real consumer behavior.

European brands found themselves racing toward a goal imposed more by political narrative than by organic market demand. They invested billions in electric platforms, converted factories, and redesigned entire model lineups. Not out of gradual consumer-driven choice, but out of necessity to align with standards that promised to rewrite the market in just a few years.

The problem is that demand did not move at the same speed as supply. Infrastructure developed unevenly, costs remained high, regulatory uncertainty fueled caution. Meanwhile, traditional cars — the ones authorities wanted to phase out with a calendar decree — continued to represent for many consumers the simplest, most accessible, and rational solution.

Thus, European brands found themselves in a dangerous middle ground: too committed to electric models to turn back without losses, yet still dependent on combustion models to sustain accelerated transition. Not disoriented by technology, but by the pace imposed on the transition.

The result is strategic fragmentation. Some brands bet on fully electric lineups before the market was ready to absorb them. Others slowed down, risking the appearance of indecision. All, in one way or another, had to chase targets that changed faster than industrial certainty.

Meanwhile, non-European competitors played a different game: less ideological, more opportunistic. They observed, adapted their offerings to different markets, and calibrated prices and technologies with greater flexibility. While Europe tried to lead the market, others simply chose to listen to it.

This is not to deny the necessity of the energy transition. It is to acknowledge that forcing the pace beyond the system’s absorption capacity produces distortions. Investments struggle to pay off, factories operate under pressure, and prices are often out of sync with actual purchasing power. Most importantly, it erodes confidence, both internally and externally.

The decline being discussed today is not the inevitable sunset of a tired industry. It is the consequence of a strategy that confused objectives with timing, aspiration with reality. It was assumed that setting a high standard would automatically create the conditions to meet it.

But the market cannot be educated by deadlines. It is convinced by better products, accessible offerings, and solutions coherent with everyday life. When this balance breaks, even the strongest brands falter.

Today, European brands do not pay a deficit of engineering. They pay for having had to chase a trajectory that was too rigid in a context that demanded flexibility. And when strategy loses contact with reality, it is not ideals that collapse first: it is competitiveness.

© Simone Marchetti Cavalieri